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FOREWORD
This report is one of a series of design surveys being
produced by industrial contractors as part of the NASA
Design Criteria Program. The objective of the program is
to provide a unification of design approaches for the devel-
opment of space vehicles and their major components. The
surveys are intended to document design experience gained
from specific NASA projects and will be used as an aid in
identifying suitable topics for design criteria monographs.
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1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
imm
The Pioneer VI orientation control
system design survey covers only the
current series of Pioneer Interplane-
tary Spacecraft (Pioneers VI through
X). All of these spacecraft are
essentially of the same configuration.
To date, Pioneers VI through VIII have
been launched. Pioneer IX is sched-
uled for a 1968 launch and Pioneer X
for a 1969 launch. The generally suc-
cessful and trouble-free design and
development of the Pioneer VI orien-
tation control system is coedited to:
• A simple and basically
sound design concept
• Use of proven hardware
• Efficient and technically
competent management
• Early determination of most
of the system requirements
The entire development was performed
with no overruns in cost or schedule.
The control system equipment, des-
cribed in Section 2, was relatively un-
sophisticated, except for the sun
detector, and required no advances in
state-of-the-art technology. The func-
tional performance of the orientation
control system met or exceeded the
specified requirements with a few minor
exceptions.
Section 3 describes the historical
evolution of the control system equip-
ment from the first feasibility studies
until the completion of the design
phase of the program.
4. 13 summarizes and categorizes the
problems and lists some general
techniques for preventing problems
of the type which occurred.
The sun sensors were the most dif-
ficult assembly of the orientation con-
trol system. Sun sensor problems
included fabrication and testing dif-
ficulties, thermal compensation prob-
lems, component procurement and
reordering problems, and an unexpect-
edly short life in orbit due to extreme
sensitivity to radiation. It is believed
that the chief single cause of these
problems was the use of a new and
relatively unknown device for the
sensor detectors. In 1963, the use of
proven hardware for every component
was a severe design constraint, and
the use of some new devices was
unavoidable. Nevertheless, the
experience on Pioneer supports the
well -known principle that the use of
proven components reduces risks and
problems.
Section 5 describes the innovations
which were produced in developing the
orientation control system. Due
largely to the effort to use proven
techniques, no significant advances in
technology were produced.
The changes which would be made "if
the development could be done over
again" are described in Section 6.
The chief changes which would be
made are listed below:
1) Improved detectors would be
used in the sun sensors.
z	 ,
Despite the general success of the
development, a number of serious
problems and "near misses" did occur.
Section 4. describes the problems
which were encountered. Subsection
1
2) A modified redundancy
technique would be used in
the electronics to permit
checkout of all redundant
components at the black-
box level.
3) The sun sensor design 8) Interface compatibility would x
would be modified to be more carefully proven.
improve the ease of
fabrication. 9) A backup design for the sun
4) The sun sensor test equip- sensors would be developed
ment would be modified to in parallel with the baseline
improve the accuracy and design until the completion
repeatability of tests. of detector evaluation testing.
5) The pneumatic valve and The recommended changes would not
regulator would be changedB	 g have materially impacted the functionalY	 P
to a leakage-redundant type. performance of the control system ex-
cept to avoid the sun sensor radiation
6) The pneumatic tube fittings damage problem,	 The chief benefits of JAIand fill valve would be these changes would have been lower
modified to improve the schedule and cost risks, greater design
ease of fabrication. margins, fewer problems in fabrication, a
integration, and testing, and greater
7) AC input signals for the sun confidence in the flight performance of
sensors would be generated the system,	 Predicting the effect of
by the electronics assembly these changes on the total program pro••
rather than by the space- ject cost, if they had been adopted, has
craft equipment converter. not been attempted.
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Fr	 2 . SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
2. 1 GENERAL RFQUIREMENTS
AND GOALS
T he Pioneer orientation control system
(OCS) was specitically designed to
meet the requirements of an interplane-
tary probe mission for a spacecraft
launched into the ecliptic plane. The
design was intended to optimize the
achievement of the following spacecraft
goals.
• Provide a corr:rnunication
capability of at least 50 million
nmi
• Require minimum weight and
power
• Provide lowest possible mag-
netic field
normal to the spin axis and symmetri-
cal about the mast. T he function of
the OCS is to align the spin axis nor-
mal to the sun line for maximum solar
array power and normal to the plane of
the ecliptic so that the major antenna
beam lobe coincides with the ecliptic
plane. The orientation is accomplished
by releasing pulses of cold gas from a
pneumatic nozzle as described in Sub-
section 1.2. The chief requirements
identified for the OCS, in addition to
the general spacecraft goals listed pre-
viously, are to:
1! Ultimately ori( • nt the spacecraft
spin axis perpendicular to the
sun-spacecraft line to within
:Lt.  5 deg and perpendicular to the
ecliptic plane to within t1 deg.
L
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• Provide a thermal design capa-
ble of operating over a range of
solar distances between 0.8 and
1. 2 AU
• Use proven hardware
• Provide a probability not less
than 0. 8 of 6 months life in orbit
• Achieve injection from a Thor/
Delta boost vehicle
• Meet a schedule of 21 months
from go-ahead to first launch
• Minimize costs
The design chosen to meet these goals
is illustrated in Figure 1. The space-
craft is spin oriented to maximize
stability and control simplicity and to
minimize thermal p roblems. The
mast along the spin axis contains a
high gain fan beam antenna producing
a "pancake-sha ped" radiation pattern
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Figure 1 . Pioneer VI Spacecraft
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Z) Orient the spacecraft perpendicu-
lar to the sun-spacecraft line as
soon after launch as is possible.
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3) Orient the spacecraft perpendicu-
lar to the ecliptic plane as soon
as is possible after the near-
earth geometry permits, but be-
fore the bit rate would be lowered
below that specified due to the
reduction of gain with distance of
the omnidirectional low-gain an-
tenna.
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Figure 2. Orientation Control Subsystem
Block Diagram
sensors, designated A, B, C, and D,
are spaced at 90-deg intervals about the
spacecraft and are used to control the
timing and duration of gas firings which
apply torque increments  to the space-
craft. The fifth sun sensor, E, supplies
a reference timing pulse once per
revolution of the spacecraft for use in
the control system logic and the experi-
ments. The electronics assembly pro-
vides the logic and signal conditioning
circuitry to process the sun sensor
signals and drive the pneumatic valve.
The pneumatics assembly stores gas
under high pressure, regulates it to a
lower pressure, and releases it through
a solenoid valve and nozzle at the end
of a boom in response to signals from
the electronics.
8) Provide a system that is not de-
	
An important design feature is the use
pendent on the timing of the
	
of a single gas jet and solenoid valve
receipt of commands such that the
	
controlled by several sun sensors.
failure to receive a command at
	
Each sun sensor is a simple, binary-
the proper time will not cause any
	
output photodetector with a specific
unplanned firings or loss of gas.	 field-of-;view. The proper sun sensoris enabled to fire the valve when the
command status is correct, as deter-
mined by the time history of commands
and sun sensor illuminations. The axis
and direction of precession are deter-
mined by the orientation of the nozzle
boom relative to the sun line at the
effective center of the torque impulse.
Sensors A and C are used to orient the
spin axis normal to the sun line; sensors
B and D are used to orient the spin axis
normal to the ecliptic. Since the two
pairs of sensors are at right angles
about the spacecraft, there is ideally
no cross coupling between the two ori-
entation maneuvers.
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4) Provide information on the angles
that have been traversed so that
the pointing of the spacecraft may
be reconstructed as a function of
time of the mission and to hold
the errors of this reconstruction
to the minimum possible.
5) Provide enough pneumatic gas to
perform all the necessary
maneuvers adequately under the
worst conditions of temperature,
errors, leakage, etc. , that may
be reasonably expected.
6) Provide, through instrumentation,
knowledge of the quantity of gas
remaining.
7) Provide a system wherein any
single electronic part failure will
not prevent the successful per-
formance of the requirements.
9) Limit the wobble resulting from
orientation maneuvers to less
than i deg maximum.
10) Provide a sun reference pulse to
the experiments once per space-
craft revolution.
2. 2 ORIENTATION CONCEPT
The Pioneer OCS consists of five sun
sensors, an electronics assembly, and
a pneumatic assembly as shown sche-
matically in Figure 2. Pour of the sun
i2.3 ORIENTATION CONTROL
EQUIPMENT
2, 3. 1 Sun Sensors
Each of the sun sensors has the function
of sensing the presence of the sun
whenever the sun is within the sensor
field-of-view, and abruptly changing its
electrical impedance between the il-
luminated and nonilluminated conditions.
The sensing is performed by photo-
sensitive SCR's (PSCR's) conrected in
a redundant quad for each sensor. The
fields-of-view are established by
aluminum shade structures in front of
the detectors. Thermal compensation
and light threshold adjustment are
provided by a resistor and thermistor
selected at assembly and connected in
parallel between the gate and cathode of
each PSCR. The sun sensors are
mounted on brackets outside the space-
craft circumference with passive ther-
mal control provided by deposited
aluminum thermal coatings. The ap-
proximate locations and fields-of-view
of the sun sensors are shown in Figure 3.
2.3.2 Pneumatics Assembly
The pneumatics assembly store y
 gas
under high pressure, regulates the gas
to a lower pressure,  and provides a
valve and nozzle for exp;.lsion of gas in
response to commands from the elec-
tronics assembly. The components of
the pneumatics system are shown sche-
matically in Figure 4.
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Fields-of-View
HIGH
PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER
FILL	 PRESSURE
VALVE	 REGULATOR I	 PSWITCHE
rL11KPRESSURElOTTLE	 3000.	 J P51
NOZZLE
Figure 4. Pneumatics Assembly
Block Diagram
The gas bottle is a pressure sphere
containing; nitrogen gas under 3, 250 psi
of pressure. This bottle is mounted on
the central axis of the spacecraft near
the center of gravity to minimize the
effects of gas usage. A combination
pressure regulator and relief valve
mount directly to the bottle, regulating
the pressure to 50 psi. A fill line is
connected at the regulator inlet port,
with a fill valve at the other end of the
line near the spacecraft periphery. A
high pressure transducer mounted on
the fill valve provides an analog signal
indicating the pressure and thus the
quantity of gas remaining in the vessel.
The output of the pressure regulator is
connected by aluminum tubing to the
solenoid valve at the. end of the orienta-
tion boom. Flexible teflon tubing is used
in the vicinity of the boom hinge. The
nozzle is located adjacent to the solenoid
valve to minimize thrust buildup and de-
cay times. A pressure switch is provided
between the valve and nozzle to monitor
gas firings. The pneumatic components
are nonredundant. A complete descrip-
tion and analysis of the pneumatics
assembly is given in Reference 1.
2.3.3 Electronics Assembly
The electronics assembly contains all
the logic and amplification functions of
the OCS. The circuits are digital in
nature and are completely redundant so
that no single part failure will affect the
functional performance. The assembly
consists of 0 modules of cordwood
welded -construction. No integrated cir-
cuits are used. A single connector is
used for all connections which interface
with the assembly.
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The majority of circuits are made re-
dundant by tripling the circuits and using
voting logic to determine the majority
docison. The remaining circuits, in-
cluding the voting circuits, use quad
redundancy applied at the part :level.
Figure 5 shows a simplified block di%,-
gram of the electronics without redun-
dancy; that is, this block diagram would
apply if no redundancy were present.
The sun sensors, which act as diodes
when illuminated and as open circuits
when dark, are included in the diagram
because they are intimately associated
with the logic. The blocks fabled. A:%;- 1
and AC-2 represent windings on the
spacecraft static converter which supply
a half-wave rectified voltage to the
orientation electronics. The illumination
of sensors A, B, C, or D in conjunction
with an appropriate ground command
produces a rectified current to the valve
driver circuit which causes a gas firing.
A timing signal from sensor E to enable
these firings is also used to ensure that
a firing of proper duration takes place
regardless of the timing of ground com-
mands received. Thus, is the run is in
the center of sensor B's field-of--view
when the enabling command is received,
no firing takes place until the next revo-
lution of the spacecraft when the sun
enters sensor B's field-of-view. This
feature assures the desired center of
thrust as well as the correct gas firing
duration.
The one-shot multivibrator (OSMV) in-
dicated in Figure 5 operates in conjunc-
tion with sun sensor E to produce a
reference pulse once per revolution to
the experiments and telemetry unit.
Figure 5. Electronics Assembly
Block Diagram
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2.4 ORIENTATION MANEUVERS
At the end of the third boost stage the
spacecraft is spun up and separated
from the booster. After boom deploy-
ment, which is initiated automatically
upor, separation, the spin rate is
nominally 60 rpm.
The deployment of the booms initiates
orientation step No. 1 by enabling sun
sensors A and C. Sensor A looks up
(toward the antenna end) and sensor C
looks down, with their fields-of-viewjust meeting at the spacecraft equatori-
al plane. The elevation field-of-view
of either sensor is 80 deg, so that the
sun must not be within 10 deg of the
spin axis in order for step No, i ori-
entation to begin. This ccastraint is
achieved by arranging the launch
trajectory to be compatible with this
requirement.
Whichever sensor (A or C) is illumina-
ted by sunlight initiates gas firings
which precess the spacecraft equatorial
plane closer to the sun line in the
shortest direction. This precession
continues until the remaining sensor is
illuminated, producing a pulse which
is utilized by the electronics logic cir-
cuitry to turn off step No. i orientation.
Since some wobble will genexllly re-
main at this time, it may be necessary
to repeat step No. 1 by ground com-
mand after the wobble has been damped
out. The final accuracy of step No. 1
orientation is t0. 5 deg. The time re-
quired, not including damping time, is
less than 15 min.
Step No. ;G is performed using the space-
craft low gain omnidirectional antenna
for communications. The spacecraft
should be at least 250, 000 mi from the
earth before the start of step No. 2 to
provide stable geometry between the
spacecraft orbital plane and the ground
tracking station. At the completion of
step No. 2, the low gain antenna is
switched off; the high gain antenna is
switched on; and the orientation control
system is switched off except for the
reference timing pulses from sen sensor
E. The accuracy of step No. 2 is es-
timated to be fi. 0 deg. The time to
perform step No. 2 is largely a function
of command rate and is not critical.
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2.5 SUMMARY OF OCS DESIGN Magnetic
SPECIFICA'T'IONS Field:	 <0. i gamma at
magnetometer
The following parameters summarize
the chief specifications of the orienta- Assessed
tion control system: Reliability:	 >0. 98 for 6 mo in
orbit
Accuracy:	 f0. 5 deg relative to
sun UniqueIt. 0 deg relative to Features:	 100 percent redun-
earth dancy of all elec-
tronic and sun
Orientation sensor parts
Capability:	 ZZ5 deg minimum A more complete description of the
Weight:	 <6. 5 lb including gas Pioneer orientation control system is
contained in Reference Z.	 Further
Power:	 0. b w when valve details on the errors and tolerances of
not firing the control system are given in the
6. 3 w when valve is general system error analysis of Ref-
firing erence 3.
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3. HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF DESIGN DEVELOPMENT
3. 1 EARLY HISTORY
The essential concept of the Pioneer
orientation control system was first
described by T. G. Windeknecht in 1961(Reference 4). The system originated
by Windeknecht utilized two gas jets,
each controlled by a separate sun sen-
sor, to orient the body-fixed solar
panels of a spinning spacecraft perpen-
dicular to the sun line. Solar panels
were to be located at one end of the
cylindrical spacecraft. Brief gas firing
impulses, t-wo per revolution, were to
be used to precess the spacecraft spin
axis to a d:%rection parallel to the sun
line. Only one axis of orientation con-
trol was considered in the system
described by Windeknecht.
In early 1962, TRW proposed to NASA
a spacecraft conceived to extend the
capabilities of the earlier Pioneer
series. The orientation control sys-
tem proposed at that time was concep-
tually similar to Windeknecht's attitude
control method, The TRW proposal re-
sulted in a 2-1/2 month study contract(NAS2-884) to examine the feasibility
of an interplanetary probe for the inter-
national quiet sun year. These studies
produced a refined concept for the
spacecraft and the orientation control
system including the following features:
• Spin axis alignment perpendicular
to the sun line, with solar cells
on the outer surface of the cylin-
de r.
• The capability to align a high
gain antenna beam with the eclip-
tic plane by means of a second
axis of attitude control.
• A total of six sun sensors: four
for controlling gas firings; one
to indicate sun line perpendicu-
larity to the spin axis; and one
for timing reference pulses.
• AL11 orientation steps to be initi-
ated by ground command.
Following the 2-1 /2 month study contract,
an RFP was issued by NASA. TRW
submitted a proposal on 4 March 1963
with relatively few significant changes
in the OCS concept. The number of
sun sensors was reduced from six to
five in the proposed design; and elec-
tronic component redundancy was pro-
posed in response to RFP requirements.
3.2 DESIGN CONCEPTS AT
PROGRAM START
The conceptual design of the sun sen-
sor assemblies did not change signifi-
cantly between the contract go-ahead
in September 1963 and the final design
described in Paragraph 2. 3. 1. SCR
detectors in a redundant quad were
selected to perform the sensing func-
tion and view angles were established
by simple sun shades. The details of
level setting, thermal control and
compensation, radiation protection,
alignment control, etc., were not
determined until later in the program.
The electronics assembly also changed
very little between the initial concept
and the final design described in Para-
graph 2. 3. 3. The method of imple-
menting redundancy was not firmly
established at the program start; but
the voting circuit approach was chosen
soon after the beginning of work.
• A single gas jet for all orienta-
	 The pneumatics assembly concept at
tion pulses, with relatively long
	 the program start utilized a pneumatic
pulse durations (90 deg of space-	 nozzle at the end of the antenna mast
craft rotation per firing).
	 rather than on a boom. The solenoid
8
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valve was to be located inside the
spacecraft compartment, a configura-
tion which would have produced long
rise and fall times for the pneumatic
pulses. The reason for this design
choice was an uncertainty concerning
what type of booms, if any, would be
included on the spacecraft. The TRW
proposal called for short rigid booms;
a later NASA directive eliminated the
booms entirely; and a final directive
following further studies called for
the use of relatively long semiflexible
booms. When the boom configuration
was settled, the pneumatic valve and
nozzle were relocated close together
at the end of one of the booms (there-
afL;,r designated the orientation boom).
The remainder of the pneumatics
assembly remainded basically un-
changed in concept throughout the pro-
gram.
3.3 CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The development of the Pioneer orienta-
tion control subsystem started officially
on 21 September 1963. A preliminary
system specification was written by
1 October 1963, and a PERT chart for
control system tasks was prepared
shortly afterward. Control system
sizing studies and dynamic motion
analyses were started at once. A con-
ceptual design review of the OCS was
conducted on 4 October 1963, with no
significant changes recommended. The
control system analysis continued, and
an analog simulation of the orientation
maneuvers was started on 2 January
1964. The simulation revealed a
stability problem which is described in
Subsection 4. 1; a change in the orienta-
tion logic was made to eliminate this
instability. The analog simulation was
repeated with completely normal be-
havior. The simulation, which included
the effects of flexible booms and a
wobble damper, was completed on 28
January 1964. Detailed results of this
study are reported in Reference 5. A
final error analysis of the OCS was
completed and published in April 1965(Reference 3).
The overall time from go-ahead to the
release of drawings for the OCS equip-
ment was approximately 8 months, very
close to the planned schedule. A major
9
factor in , maintaining this schedule is
believed to be a relatively strict adher-
ence to a detailed program plan.
The chronological development of the
three assemblies which comprise the
orientation control subsystem is
described in Paragraphs 3. 3. 1 through
3. 3. 3.
3. 3. 1 Sun Sensor Chronological
Development
Initial work on the sur, sensor assem-
blies started a few weeks before the
official go-ahead on 21 September 1963.
A preliminary unit specification was
produced by 1 October. A specification
for the PSCR detectors was prepared
and negotiated, and the engineering
model detectors were ordered by mid-
Novembcr. In the meantime develop-
ment tests were performed using sample
PSCR's. These tests revealed electri-
cal and thermal problems which are
described in Subsection 4. 5. Correc-
tive steps were taken; and the engineer-
ing model sun sensors were completed
in early February 1964. Test equip-
ment for the sun sensors was designed
and fabricated by the time the sensor
engineering models were available.
The sun sensor engineering model tests
were completed during the first week
of March, with acceptable functional
and environmental performance. The
final design review was conducted on
20 March, and all of the drawings were
released to manufactu.l;ag on 7 April
1964. Test procedures and final design
specifications were released by May
1964.
The preliminary thermal design and
analysis of the sun sensors was com-
pleted near the end of January 1964.
A major error in the original thermal
analysis was discovered in September
1964, changing the equilibrium tempera-
tures of sensors A and C by more than
600F. The final thermal data for both
transient and steady-state sensor
operation was not available until
October 1964, 6 months after drawing
release. One result of the transient
analysis was a predicted 30-min delay
in the start of step No. 1 orientation
following a worst-case coast and
eclipse of the spacecraft„ The final
^a
^x
i
	
k
{	 k
10
a . 1 ' .
^.
1
Ct
r^
results of the thermal analysis had
relatively little impact upon the sensor
design margins. Thermal vacuum
tests in April 1965 supported the
predicted thermal behavior of the sen-
sors.
The first production model sun sensors
were completed in January and
February of 1965. Considerable diffi-
culty in fabrication and testing was
experienced as described in Subsections
4. 6 and 4. 12. Qualification tests were
passed without incident. The first sun
sensors were integrated in March 1965
revealing the electronics assembly
interface problem described in Subsec-
tion 4. 8. This problem was corrected
by a minor change in the electronics
,assembly. The remainder of the sun
sensor production, testing, integra-
tion, and flight performance was un-
eventful except for the Pioneer VII
orientation anomaly discussed in Sub-
section 4. 11.
3. 3. 2 Electronics Assembly
Chronological Development
The development of the electronics
assembly closely paralleled that of the
sun sensors. Work officially com-
menced on 21 September 1963; a pre-
liminary unit specification and a
schematic block diagram were pre-
pared within a few days' time. Mag-
netically acceptable components were
chosen from the Pioneer approved
parts list, and circuit design and
breadboard testing was begun within
2 weeks of the program go-ahead.
The electronics assembly breadboards
were completed during November 1963,
and were modified and completely
tested for functional performance and
adequacy of redundancy by mid-
December. A design review was con-
ducted on 19 December 1963, but a
partial rigdesign of the electronics to
eliminate the control system stability
problem (see Subsection 4. 1) resulted
in a repetition of the design review on
7 February 1964. Progress on the
electronics assembly engineering
model proceeded in the meantime.
The model was completed on 12
February 1964 and was completely
tested by early March. The test
equipment was fabricated and tested
concurrently with the engineering
model fabrication and testing.
Amendment 10 to the Pioneer space-
craft contract required a conditioned
sun reference pulse from sun sensor
E, the signal conditioning circuitry
necessitated the addition of another
module to the electronics assembly.
The changes to implement this require=
ment were carried out during March
and early April of 1964, including
changes to the test equipment consoles.
A final design review of the electronics
was held on 14 April, with design
approval being granted. All drawings
and test procedures were relased to
manufacturing in early May 1964, and
the test equipment consoles were trans-
ferred to manufacturing at that time.
Fabrication, testing, and integration of
the flight model electronics assemblies
were uneventful except for two pro-
blems which are described in Subsec-
tion 4. 8. One of these problems
necessitated the addition of a small
circuit board to the electronics in
April 1965. Subsequent to that change,
no significant problems involving the
electronics assembly have occurred.
3. 3. 3 Pneumatics Assembly
Chronological Development
The development of the Pioneer pneu-
matics assembly was started in late
August 1963. The design and develop -
ment of the pneumatic ground support
equipment was carried out in parallel
with the development of the flight
pneumatic equipment. Long lead iterhs
for the ground equipment were ordered
by the end of September. By early
October a preliminary unit specification
and a preliminary solenoid valve 'speci-
fication were issued. Specifications
for the major remaining pneumatic
components (the pressure regulator
and relief valve, the pressure switch,
and the high pressure transducer)
were completed in October 1963 and
were released for bids the following
^^	 k
ggz
4	 t
mouth. A vibration test plan for the
pneumatic components was completed
around 1 November 1963; and vibration
testing of most of the pneumatics com-
ponents was performed during December.
Development tests were performed
between November 1963 and February
1964 to measure solenoid valve delay,
line pressure drops, shape and magni-
tude of pulse thrust, and residual mag-
netic fields. A reliability test plan to
evaluate the effects of acceleration and
long term vacuum on 20 solenoid valves
and five pressure regulators was form-
ulated during March and was revised in
April and July of 1964. Reliability and
life testing were begun with the receipt
of the engineering model components
in August 1964; the first phase of this
testing was completed in September
1964; and the second phase was com-
pleted approximately one year later.
The first pneumatic test cart was com-
pleted in March 1964; and fabrication
of the second (deliverable) test unit was
started. The second test cart was
completed in May 1964 but was not
delivered to integration testing until
January 1965.
The pneumatics assembly specification
and test procedures were issued in
June and July 1964. Engineering model
tests of the pneumatics assembly were
performed from August through October
1964, with entirely ;acceptable results.
A combined first and second pneumatics
de.5ign review was held on 6 November
1964. Drawings for TRW-built com-
ponents were released in June 1964, 5
months before the design review. No
significant changes to the pneumatics
assembly have been required during the
remainder of Pioneer program activi-
ties up to the present time.
3.4 CUSTOMER DIRECTED CHANGES
Three customer directed changes to the
Pioneer spacecraft affected the orienta-
tion control system development. The
TRW proposal called for short, rigid
booms for inertial control with the
pneumatic valve and nozzle at the end of
one of the booms. Amendment i deleted
the booms from the spacecraft at the
beginning of the program. The pneu-
matic nozzle was relocated on the
antenna mast; and the solenoid valve
was relocated near the center of the
spacecraft. This configuration pro-
duced thrust rise and trailoff problems
which were studied at considerable
length. Amendment 3, issued in Octo-
ber 1963, reinstated booms in the
design; but these booms were consid-
erably longer and hence more flexible
than those of the original TRW proposal.
The valve solenoid and nozzle were re-
located on the end of a boom, solving
the trail-off problem. The addition of
flexible booms caused the analog simu-
Iacio :; the orientation control system
to be more complicated than the simu-
lation which was planned. Additional
effort was required to iterate the pneu-
matic design and for additional analog
simulation. The schedule delay caused
by these amendments was approximately
four weeks (Reference 6).
Amendment 10, received in ;February
1964, requested a conditioned sun
reference pulse from the electronics.
This change required the development
of some new circuits, contruction of new
breadboards, modification of the engi-
neering model, engineering model
retesting, documentation, drawing
changes, and changes to the test equip-
ment. The schedule delay for the elec-
tronics was an estimated three to four
weeks (Reference 7).
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4. DISCUSSION OF MAJOR PROBLEMS
It
n -
The development of the Pioneer OCS
equipment was generally straightfor-
ward and successful. All tasks were
performed within the alloted cost and
schedule, and all, performance require-
ments were met or exceeded with one
or two minor exceptions. A number of
significant problems did occur, how-
ever, and are described in Subsections
4. 1 thru 4. 12. Most of the conclusions
to be drawn from these problems are
given in Subsection 4. 13.
4.1 CONTROL SYSTEM STABILITY
PROBLEM
The orientation control system as first
conceived was found to be unstable.
This instability, which was completely
unexpected, was uncovered during an
analog computer simulation of the step
No. 1 orientation maneuvers. The
simulation showed that a divergent
unbounded wobble oscillatio,a would
occur when the spin axis approached
the normal to the sun line.
At the time of the instability problem,
sun sensors A and C were designed to
have a small deadband between their
fields-of-view. It was intended that
whichever sensor viewed the sun would
initiate gas pulses to precess the spin
axis until the sun was in the deadband
at the spacecraft equatorial plane.
At this point neither sensor would see
the sun and the gas firings would cease.
The problem was due to the relatively
large wobble amplitude introduced by
each pulse. The wobble was not consid-
ered a likely problem source because
analysis had shown that gas firings
once per revolution would cancel
wobble contributions rather than allow-
ing wobble to accumulate. The analog
simulation showed that wobble was
well-controlled until the sun entered
the deadband. At that point, however,
firings would occur on every other
cycle rather than once per cycle, with
wobble adding in-phase. Eventually,
the sun sensor on the other side of the
deadband would also begin to view the
sun on alternate revolutions, adding
to the instability. The wobble would
increase without bound until the gas
supply was exhausted.
Once this problem was recognized, it
was easily corrected by small changes
in the sun sensor viewing angles and the
electronics logic. The viewing angle
deadband was reduced to zero and the
control system logic was revised to
terminate step No. 1 as soon as both
sensors (A and C_) have been illuminated
by the sun.
The control stability problem was
recognized early enough in the program
that it could be corrected without signi-
ficant schedule or cost impact. It is
doubtful that the problem could have
been avoided by any presently known
design pr,-,ctices. The occurrence of
the instability problem is now well
known by TRW control system engineers
and may help to avert such problems in
future analogous situations.
4.2 MAGNETIC CLEANLINESS
PROBLEMS
Despite the stringency of magnetic
cleanliness requirements for Pioneer,
only minor problems were encountered
in designing the OCS to meet these
requirements. The electronics assem-
bly utilized standard components
identified on the Pioneer parts approval
program with no significant difficulty.
The pneumatic assembly required as
specially designed solenoid valve to
minimize the residual magnetic field.
This design proved to be relatively
straightforward.
zThe sun sensor development was
impacted by magnetic requirements
more severely than the other two assem-
blies. The prime supplier of the sun
sensor detector quads, Solid State Pro-
ducts, Inc. , was unable to devise a
hermetic detector window package which
would meet the magnetic requirement.
The material normally used for a win-
dow style detector header i s Invar, a
highly ferromagnetic alloy with a low
expansion coefficient. Nonferromag-
netic metals which could meet the
magnetic requirements have relatively
high expansion coefficients making a
glass-to-metal seal difficult to achieve.
After some preliminary testing and
analysis it was decided that nonher-
metic detectors could probably be used,
subject to additional test verification.
As a backup, however, an alternate
detector procurement was initiated.
The alternate detectors were SCR's
manufactured by Western Semiconduc-
tors, Inc., in a window package which
exceeded the magnetic field allotment.
When further tests established the
acceptability of nonhermetic detectors,
the procurement of an alternate device
was abandoned. Western Semiconduc-
tors had encountered serious difficulty
in manufacturing the alternate devices
and was therefore entirely agreeable to
a cancellation of the purchase order.
The failure to develop a sealed package
for the sun sensor detectors caused
the devices to be extremely vulnerable
to damage during sun sensor assembly.
The manufacturing problems which
arose from this cause are discussed in
Subsection 4. 6.
4.3 WEIGHT PROBLEMS
The primary weight consideration in
developing the Pioneer OCS was the
strong weight incentive provided in the
contract. Considerable ingenuity was
used to save tenths or even hundredths
of a pound wherever possible.
The electronics assembly utilized an
innovation to provide RF shielding and
minimum weight simultaneously. The
modules at the top of the electronic
package were plated with metal rather
than using a cover on the assembly.
The result was a thin RF-proof enclo-
sure around the package that minimized
size as well as weight.
Weight was strongly considered also in
the choice of designs and materials for
the pneumatic components. The pres-
sure vessel was designed to have a shape
and material which would minimize
weight; this resulted in a spherical
titanium alloy vessel. Weight was also
a factor in the choice of designs for the
pressure regulator, tubing, a_id the
solenoid valve.
The sun sensor shade structures were
designed to have brazed light-gauge
aluminum construction. This manufac-
turing process proved to be quite a > ...en-
sive but the weight savings justified the
expense. Another weight-saving fea-
ture of the sun sensors was the con-
nector chosen. In. order to perform
complete functional and diagnostic
testing of the redundant detectors, a
nine-pin connector was desired for each
sun sensor. Standard nine -pin connec-
tors were both bulky and heavy in rela-
tion to the overall sensor weight of
approximately 0. 2 lb each. A new light-
weight connector manufactured by
Cannon had an all nylon construction.
except for the pins and sockets. After
evaluation, this connector was added
to the approved parts list and has been
used with failure-free service through-
out the program.
In summary, weight was not a problem.
for the Pioneer OCS in the sense that
the basic requirement could have 'been
met by straightforward design. Consid-
erable attention was devoted to weight
economy, however, becuase of the con-
tract incentive, and a significant per-
centage of the small OCS weight was
trimmed away by this attention to
weight control.
4.4 PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING.
REDUNDANCY
The implementation of redundancy in
the Pioneer OCS was undoubtedly the
chief source of design difficulties for
the electronics and sun sensor assem-
blies. The pneumatics assembly was
not impacted by redundancy since it
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was established early in the program
that redundancy would not be required
for pneumatic components.
It was anticipated at the start of the
electronics assembly design that redun-
dancy would greatly increase the size,
weight, complexity, and power consump-
tion of the unit. These problems proved
to be somewhat more severe than expec-
ted, however, particularly in the areas
of weight and power consumption.
Other problem areas not anticipated at
the design start were:
• Testing problems and limitations
• Increase in parts count
• Performance penalties
Circuit redundancy with voting logic was
used in the timing and logic electronic
modules. Component quad redundancy
was used for the voting circuits and the
valve driver circuits, This implemen-
tation permitted complete testing of all
components at the module level, but did
not permit the testing of redundant parts
after final assembly of the unit. It was
found that a general reduction of perfor-
mance design margins was necessary to
provide redundancy without using an
excessive amount of power. The reduc-
tion of performance margins was a factor
in the sun sensor interface problem
discussed in Subsection 4. 8.
sensing angles of the sun sensors. Close
spacing and alignment of the detectors
and relatively large shade structures
were required to meet the view angle
tolerances. The large shades added
significantly to the weight and fabrica-
tion cost of the sun sensors. The close
spacing of detectors was achieved with
some difficulty, adding considerably to
the detector cost. The auxiliary resis-
tors and thermistors used for level
setting and thermal compensation were
difficult to package in the small space
available for sun sensor electronics;
the need for redundancy ?aggravated
fabrication problems and necessitated
the use of a less-than-optimum thermal
compensation circuit because additional
components would not fit in the cavity.
Redundancy in the pneumatics assembly
was considered at the beginning of the
Pioneer program. Leakage of the sole-
noid valve was determined to be the
most likely failure mode of the pneu-
matics. Valve redundancy was aban-
doned because it would cause increases
in size, weight, power consumption,
and magnetic field.
Several alternatives to the selected
redundancy implementations are
described in Subsections 3. 3 and 6. 1.
The methods chosen were adequate to
meet the system requirements
although numerous difficulties stemmed
from the use of redundancy. The actual
reliability increase produced by the use
Difficulty was also encountered in the o f redundancy would be difficult to
implementation of sun sensor redundancy, estimate for the following reasons;
despite the fact that the PSCR's were
chosen to facilitate redundant sensing. 	 1) The reduction of performance
The major problem areas were: 	 margins caused by the use of
• Providing the required field- of-	 redundancy are not reflected in
view for four distinct detectors 	 the assessed reliability.
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2) The assessed reliability figures
are, to some extent, misleading,
if not properly interpreted. A
design for which no single part
failure will cause a system fail-
ure partially avoids this problem
since a single component with an
atypical failure probability is
less significant.
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• Negotiating a detector specifica-
tion with a suitable packaging
configuration
o Packaging problems for auxiliary
components
The field - of-view tolerances ranged
between 0. 5 and 2. 5 deg for the critical
14. 5 PROBLEMS UNCOVERED IN
DEVELOPMENT TESTS
Development tests of the pneumatics
equipment revealed two problems worth
noting. The first problem was a leak-
age rate for the solenoid valve which
exceeded the leakage budget The teflon
valve seat was found to be inadequate
for the required tight seal. This pro-
blem was solved by replacing the valve
seat with a special type of rubber con-
taining no volatile plasticizer. The
same material has been used on sub-
sequent space applications as a result
of its successful use in the Pioneer pro-
gram.
The second problem encountered in the
pneumatics development tests was the
formation of ice in the regulator that
prevented the valve from seating
properly during low-temperature
operation. This problem was solved
by using very dry nitrogen gas to
ensure a dew point well below the lowest
regulator temperature experienced
during the throttling operation.
PSCR's and the waveform of the volt-
age applied across the device. Ideally,
the voltage at the PSCR gate terminal
would be determined only by the photo
current across the gate/cathode %%nc-
tion and the value of the resistor con-
nected between the gate and cathode
terminals. When a sharp voltage pulse
is applied across the device, however,
the capacitance between the anode and
gate of the SCR conducts a voltage spike
to the gate. The electrical excitation
at the SCR gate adds to the photo
excitation to trigger the SCR. This
problem was controlled by adding an
RC filter to the interfacing electronics
to reduce the voltage rise rate of the
applied square wave voltage and by
specifying a maximum voltage rise
rate in the sun sensor design specifi-
cation.
No unique or noteworthy problems
were uncovered in the development
testing of the orientation control
electronics, except as discussed in
Subsection 4.8.
Sun sensor development tests revealed
that the PSCR detectors had relatively
high sensitivity to temperature,
becoming less sensitive at low tempera-
tures. Sample detectors with low
intrinsic sensitivity were foun(: to be
totally inoperable at expected ternpera-
tares for 1 b2 AU operation (approxi-
mately -50 F). Two corrective steps
were taken to reduce this problem.
1) The subcontractor was directed
to maximize the intrinsic detec-
tor sensitivity.
2) Temperature compensation was
provided in the sun sensor design
by incorporating a thermistor in
the detector bias circuit.
These steps reduced the problem of
temperature dependence to acceptable
limits, although some problems
remained and contributed to the high
rejection rate of sun sensors during
prodv tion tests.
Another sun sensor problem identified
during development tests was an inter-
action between the light threshold of the
4.6 F"ABRICATION PROBLEMS
The sun isensor assemblies proved to
be quite, problematic in fabrication.
The chief factors which (;G .tributed to
this difficulty were:
1) The PSCR quads were supplied in
a packaging configuration which
afforded no protection for the
detector faces and small delicate
leads. Numerous devices were
damaged before fabrication
personnel developed suitable
methods for handling the detec-
tors during assembly and testing.
2) The parameter spread of the
detectors supplied for the pro-
duction phase of the program
exceeded that of the prototype
samples supplied earlier. This
spread led to problems in
achieving adequate temperature
compensation. Detectors vrhich
failed to meet specification
limits were not rejected because
detectors were in short supply
throughout the program. A pre-
potting functional test was added
to the fabrication procedure to
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identify problems at a stage of
production where corrective
action was possible. This pro-
cedure was quite effective in
reducing the incidence of failure
in final test.
3) The small cavity for sun sensor
electronics made the wiring and
connector installation difficult to
perform.
4) The exteriors of the sun sensors
were coated with deposited
aluminum for thermal control
and gloves were required for
handling the sensors during tests.
5) Electrical pickup in the sun sen-
sor test cable was found to be
the cause of some errors in light
threshold measurements on the
first group of sensors tested.
This problem was reduced to an
acceptable level by fabricating
a new test cable with shielded
wires.
6) The repeatability of sensor
threshold measurements was
somewhat poorer than expected.
The main cause is believed to be
the sun gun lamps used in the
test. When first switched on,
the lamp brightness was not
stable; if left on for a longer
time, the lamp heating would
affect the sensor temperature,
especially during functional tests
at -40 0F. Corrective action
was not taken because the mag-
nitude of the test errors appeared
to be within acceptable limits.
Minor leakage problems were encoun-
tered in manufacturing the pneumatic
fill valves since the valve seal required
stringent fabrication tolerances. No
corrective action was deemed neces-
sary. The fill valve design, which
was modeled after a similar valve in
OGO, has now been redesigned for
future applications to avoid the pro-
blem. Minor problems also occurred
in manufacturing the flared aluminum
tubing of the pneumatics assembly.
Once again, no corrective action was
required. Tubing with brazed fittings
rather than flared tubing is now nor-
mally used for this type of application.
4.7 PROBLEMS DURING QUALIFICA-
TION AND ACCEPTANCE TESTS
No problems were uncovered 6uring the
qualification or acceptance testing of
the OCS equipment.
4.8 PROBLEMS IN INTEGRATED
SYSTEM TESTS
The major problem discovered in
integrated system tests was an incom-
patibility in the electrical interface
between the sun sensors and the
orientation control electronics. The
sun sensors were assumed to switch
abruptly when illuminated, so that the
voltage across the sensor would drop
sharply. The voltage drop was to be
differentiated by a capacitor producing
a negative pulse to terminate step No.
1 orientation. The voltage supply was
designed with very high impedance (300
K ohms) to minimize power consump-
tion. When a sun sensor was slowly
illuminated, it was found that the
leakage current through the PSCR's
increased sharply just before switching.
This leakage was sufficient to drop the
supply voltage to a low value and the
actual switching did not produce a
pulse adequate to actuate the logic
circuits. In actual use the sun sensor
would change from zero illumination
to full illumination in less than 2 mse c.
For such operation, the performance
of the sensors and electronics would
probably have been normal. In test,
the illumination was introduced much
more slowly so that the problem was
emphasized.
The compatibility problem discussed
above was discovered relatively, late
in the program. For this reason it
was decided not to change the existing
t
i4
._A
t.
i
T
^	 s
^ E
Cdesign of the electronics; instead, a
small circuit board was added to the
electronics assembly. The circuit
board contained a capacitor to main-
tain the voltage across the sun sen-
sors for brief periods of high leakage
and a series resistor to prevent
excessive capacitive discharge current
through the sensors after switching.
These additional components were
quad redundant to comply with the
redundancy specification. The ade-
quacy of this fix was checked exten
sively in ground tests and has func-
tioned normally in all Pioneer flights.
Another seriox!4i problem occurred
during the thermal vacuum testing of the
flight two Pioneer spacecraft. On the
third day of the test, when conditions
for 1. 2 AU operation were simulated,
the orientation control system failed to
operate normally. The dominant char-
acteristics of the failure were;
During the course of diagnostic testing
to isolate the cause, the problem went
away and could not be made to reappear.
Subsequent testing and data analysis
could only isolate the problem to the
spacecraft equipment converter, the
control electronics assembly, or the
sun sensors. A number of steps were
taken to correct this problem;
1) The equipment in question was
replaced.
2) A 10, 000-ohm resistor was placed
across the new equipment con-
verter output terminals to reduce
noise in the sun sensor excitation
voltage.
3) The method of illuminating sun
sensors in the test chamber was
modified.
4) T,.e removed equipment was
extensively retested. No further
evidence of malfunction was
uncovered, however, in this
retesting.
The abnormal behavior discussed above
has never been repeated either in test or
in flight. A more complete description
of this problem is given in Reference 8.
Testing the integrated control system
for pneumatic leakage presented a pro-
blem in instrumentation. The specified
limit for leakage was too low to be
measured by the storage vessel pres-
sure transducer during a short-term
test. The method first tried consisted
of measuring the differential pressure
between ffie pneumatic storage vessel
and a reference vessel while monitoring
the temperature of the gas in each
vessel. This setup proved to be a
better thermometer than a leakage
tester because the effects of gas tem-
perature uncertainties swamped out
the desired test data. An alternate
technique used with some success con-
sisted of measuring the leakage of
arsc;n gas from the pneumatics by
means of a mass spectrometer. This
method had some problems with gas
circulation and sensitivity to the skill
of the test conductor. The method
presently in use is to make long-term(30 days or longer) measurements of
the storage vessel pressure and tem-
perature, with a sufficient number of
tests to average out random errors.
Leakage rates below 2 cc/hr can be
measured by this technique.
4.9 PROBLEMS RESULTING FROMQUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIRE-
MENTS
The quality assurance (QA) requirements
on the Pioneer program were quite
stringent. The procurement of compon-
ents was performed in accordance with
the guidelines of NPC 200-2. It was first
thought that the combination of magnetic
requirements and QA requirements
might alarm prospective vendors and
cause factor-of-two increases in the
cost of components. The fears proved
to be an exaggeration of the actual prob-
lem. Some vendors who had not sup-
plied high reliability parts previously
Once the gas valve had been turned
on by an illumination of sensor A
or C during a step No. 1 maneu-
ve r, 'Yie valve would remain on
until power was removed from
3 	 the orientation control electronics.
• The control system did not res-
pond to step No. 2 commands in
either the clockwise or counter-
clockwise direction.
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qshowed considerable alarrn initially at
the requirements for traceability, proc-
e.ss control, and test record maintenance.
Once the requirements were thoroughly
understood, however, it was found that
the cost increment for QA documentation
was on the order of 10 to 15 percent.
The quality requirements did increase
schedule problems, however, due to
increases in the time for negotiating
purchase specifications and increases
in delivery schedules,
4. 10 INTERFACE PROBLEMS
Two major interface problems occurred
in the design of the Pioneer OCS equip-
ment. The first was the compatibility
problem ii: the electrical interface
between the sun sensors and the elec-
tronics, described in Subsection 4. 8.
The second was a mechanical interface
problem between the spacecraft struc-
ture and the pneumatic pressure regu-
lator. Both the structure and the regu-
lator had vibration resonances near
500 cps. The regulator resonance was
discovered during engineering model
tests of the pneumatics; the damage
threshold was determined to be between
20 and 30 g' s. A potential problem was
recognized at this time; but it was
ultimately decided that test data indi-
cated a small but positive design margin.
No damage was experienced during the
spacecraft qualification tests. On the
first Pioneer flight, however, a high
pressure leak occurred after launch.
The most probable source of leakage
was the main seat of the regulator.
Fortunately, the leakage rate was
small and decreased as the vessel
pressure became lower. After com-
pletion of the orientation maneuvers
and 6 mo time in orbit, the pneumatic
system still contained a pressure of
150 psi. On subsequent flights the
pressure vessel cradle design was
modified to provide an isolation mounting
for the pressure vessel and regulator.
4. 11 PROBLEMS IN FLIGHT
OPERATIONS
The first Pioneer flight (Pioneer VI)
revealed the mechanical interface pro-
blem discussed in Subsection 4. 10 above.
No other problems were identified until
Pioneer VII was launched, oriented, and
in orbit for approximately 6 mo. At
this time a step No. 1 orientation com-
mand was sent for the purpose of
determining the spin axis orientation
error after one-half orbital revolution.
When no gas firings occurred, a pair
of step No. 2 commands in each direc-
tion were sent. These commands also
failed to produce the normal response.
Subsequent to this failure, orientation
commands were sent to Pioneer VI(which was ot. c of gas by that time).
Some of the sun sensors produced inter-
mittent signals when enabled, while
others produced no response. Pioneer
VII was retested after approximately a
3-month time. At this time some pulses
were generated, but it appeared that the
sun sensors were operating marginally.
Sufficient data was obtained in the tests
of Pioneer VI and VII to indicate with
high probability that sun sensor de-
gradation was the cause of the orienta-
tion anomalies. Radiation damage
appeared to be an obvious explanation
but was initially viewed with skepti-
cism for the following reasons:
1) The sun sensors had 20 mils of
protective radiation resistant
glass over the detectors as com-
pared to only 8 mils of glass over
the solar cells (which had shown
negligible degradation),
2) Many experts felt that a solar
cell device would be as sensi-
tive to radiation as a siliconjunction semiconductor.
The latter premise was examined by
subjecting a few sample PSCR" s to 1
MEV electron bombardment. It was
discovered that the PSCR's were
incapacitated by radiation flux levels
several orders of magnitude below the
damage level for silicon solar cells.
After additional tests to recheck the
initial calibration and threshold adjust-
ment of the sun sensors, it was con-
cluded that radiation damage was al-
most certainly the cause of the orienta-
tion anomalies which occurred on
Pioneers VI and VII.
The first corrective step taken after
the recognition of the sun sensor radia-
tion susceptibility was to replace the
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protective glass covers on the Pioneer
C sun sensors with much thicker (100
mil) covers. Pioneer C was launched,
thereby becoming Pioneer VIII, and
successfully achieved initial orienta-
tion as did Pioneers VI and VII. The
adequacy of the design change will not
be known from flight data until early
1969. In the meanwhile, a program is
being carried out at TRW to find means
for improving the sun sensor design and
extending the range of solar distances
for sun sensor operation.
4. 12 MISCELLANEOUS DESIGN
PROBLEMS
A few notable problems were encoun-
tered in the sun sensor design which
have not been covered in the preceding
sections. These problems are outlined
below:
1) The thermal design and analysis
of the sun sensors was completed
quite late in the design evolution.
First estimates of sensor equilib-
rium temperatures proved to be
gr(,ssly in error. Thermal
behavior during launch transient
periods was not available until
after the end of the sensor design
phase. Fortunately, the thermal
behavior indicated by the final
analysis was compatible with the
sensor operating characteristics.
2) Earthshine at the time of space-
craft injection into orbit placed
a serious constraint upon the
lower sensing threshold of sun
sensors A and C. This problem
was reduced by narrowing the
view angles of the sensors so
that less diffuse light could be
incident on the detectors. The
only penalty for this change was
an unimportant increase in the
time required to complete step
No. 1 orientation.
using a low-level collimated
light source to test the view
angles and by sensing the detector
responses by means of analog
photovoltaic signals at the PSCR
gates. The sensor switching
thresholds were measured
separately using gun lamps with
no provisions for collimation
control.
4) Solid State Products, Inc. , the
only source for the PSCR's, was
unable to furnish additional units
after the first purchase order had
been filled. The unexpectedly
high attrition rate of these detec-
tors in manufacturing resulted in
a shortage of flight-quality parts.
The vendor claims to have lost
the capability to produce more of
these parts. Parts from test lots
which would normally have been
scrapped were ultimately used on
Pioneer VIII. A design change to
utilize a different detector will
almost certainly be requires. for
followon Pioneer spacecraft.
5) The design of sun sensor test
equipment was complicated by the
fact that some of the equipment
was to be supplied by the engi-
neering division and some equip-
ment (a test bench, rotary table,
optical rail, and a thermal con-
trol chamber) was to be supplied
by the manufacturing division.
This arrangement caused pro-
blems in designing test fixtures
and preparing test procedures.
4.13 PROBLEM SUMMARY
The problems outlined in Subsections
4. 1  thru 4. 12 may be categorized into
three groups:
1) Problems which could not have
been foreseen or avoided by rea-
sonable precautions
3) Testing the view angles and light
	 2) Problems which could have been
sensing thresholds of the sun sen-
	 avoided by major changes in
sors appeared to require a well-
	 equipment design concepts
collimated high-intensity light
source which was not available
	 3) Problems which could have been
among existing capital equip-
	 avoided or significantly reduced
ment in the fabrication area.
	 without changes in the designThis problem was avoided by
	 concept.
i_
2) Minor magnetic cleanliness pro-
blems in the design of the pneu-
matics assembly
4. 13. 3 Problems Avoidable Without
Design Concept Changes
9
,jThe problems which fall into each
category are listed and discussed in
Paragraphs 4. 13. 1, 4. 13. 2, and
4. 13..3 which follow.
4. 13. 1 Unavoidable Problems
The following problems appear, in
retrospect to be have been unavoidable
and/or were identified and corrected
as well as may reasonably be expected;
1) The spacecraft control system
stability problem
2) Limitations to the testing of the
electronics assembly. A some-
what different design concept
would havo permitted testing of
redundant parts at the black-box
level rather than the module level.
Recommendations for design concept
changes which would have avoided some
of the problems described above are
presented in Section 6. The alternate
concepts would undoubtedly have en-
countered some problems, but it is
believed that the alternates would have
been preferable design approaches.
3) Problems in meeting the electron-
ics assembly weight and power
budget, caused chiefly by the
requirement for redundancy
4) Problems in achieving the desired
sun sensor view angle accuracy
withYnultiple redundant detectors
5) Minor problems in the pneumatics
assembly development tests
6) Problems in obtaining hermetically
sealed detectors for the sun sen-
sors.
4. 13. 2 Problems Avoidable by Design
Concept Changes
The following problems could 'reasona-
bly have been anticipated, and could
have been avoided by changing the de-
sign concept of one or more of the
assemblies:
1) Problems in developing sun sen-
sors with PSCR detectors. Pro-
blems similar to those which
occurred should be expected
when utilizing a new device of a
rare or exotic type which has not
been thoroughly tested and is not
a "standard line" item for several
vendors. Development problems,
procurement problems, cost and
schedule problems, reordering
problems, and unique problems(such as the PSCR radiation sen-
sitivity) are high-risk factors in
a design based upon an unfamiliar
nonstandard component.
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Problems which could have been reduced
or avoided without conceptual changes
in the design of the OCS equipment are
summarized below, with brief outlines
of the means by which improvements
could have been achieved.
1) The interface problem of the sun
sensors and electronics could
have been discovered before
drawing release by testing their
compatibility during development
tests.
2) The sun sensor radiation damage
problem could have been avoided
by performing radiation tests
early in the program to examine
the assumption that the PSCR's
have a radiation tolerance similar
to solar cells. Also, a thicker
cover glass could have been used
initially to increase protection
since this apparent overdesign
would have imposed no penalties.
3) The regulator valve damage on
the first launch might have been
avoided by (a) the use of a higher
vibration qualification test level(the flight levels apparently
exceeded the qualification test
levels furnished by NASA) and(b) a more conservative design
of the pneumatic vessel and
regulator support structure in
view of the known valve resonance.
4) The anomalous behavior of the
orientation control system in the
thermal vacuum test described in
1
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Subsection 4. 8 could probably
have been avoided by generating
the sun sensor excitation voltage
in the electronics assembly
rather than using the equipment
converter output to drive the
sun sensors, or by specifying
the converter wave shapes and
noise limits more carefully.
5) The sun sensor thermal interface
was not pursued in sufficient
depth. Although no actual pro-
blem occurred, the sensors
should have been designed to
have been more carefully specified
to make the thermal design and
analysis more meaningful.
6) Fabrication testing problems for
the sun sensors could have been
reduced by greater emphasis
upon test equipment design and
small changes to improve
produ cibility.
7) The shortage of PSCR spares
could have been avoided by a
more conservative allowance for
attrition. It must be acknowleged,
however, that the actual attrition
rate could scarcely have been
anticipated. Also, it appeared
at the time that the availability of
such devices would improve with
advancing semiconductor technol-
ogy, although the opposite
actually occurred.
8) Problems in designing sun sen-
sor test equipment and preparing
test procedures could have been
reduced by more careful planning
of the test phase of the program.
4. 13.4 General Techniques for
Problem Reduction
The avoidable problems illustrate the
need for careful attention to a number
of topics. Several general techniques
for problem elimination which could
have reduced problems in the Pioneer
OSC development are listed below:
i) Use known and proven com-
ponents whenever possible.
2) Avoid the use of single-source
parts, especially if (a) the
supplier is a small company which
might go out of business, or (b)
if the part is a nonstandard item
which may be out of production
when reordering is necessary.
3) Make conservative spare parts
allowances for items which may
be difficult to reorder.
4) Carefully document and control
electrical, mechanical, thermal,
and other interfaces.
5) Insist upon quantitative test data
to support engineering judgment
on critical decisions (as in the
case of the sun sensor radiation
damage problem).
6) Use integrated equipment tests
rather than separate assembly
tests whenever possible to verify
interface compatibility and end-
to-end performance.
7) Be certain that the test equip-
ment design is adequate to
ensure accurate, repeatable
results, and be extremely
careful in simulating interfaces
for the equipment under test.
8) Thoroughly check and validate
test equipment and procedures
before the begirding of produc-
tion tests.
Although most of the items above are
familiar cliches, the problems en-
countered in the Pioneer program
might have been lessened by a more
rigorous application of these concepts.
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5. NEW CONCEPTS AND HARDWARE
One of the goals of the Pioneer program
was to use proven hardware. It was
generally found that the program
requirement-s could be met without
developing new equipment. Conse-
quently,  the innovations in the OCS
equipment were relatively few.
5. 1 OCS CONCEPT INNOVATIONS
The orientation concept used on Pioneer,
with four sun sensors and one gas jet
to provide two-axis attitude control for
a spinning spacecraft, was a new and
important advance in attitude control
system technology. Although the
Pioneer OCS was based in part upon
the ideas developed by Windeknecht(Reference 4), important improvements
were conceived and developed by TRW
as described in Subsection 3. 1 The
Pioneer spacecraft was the first space
vehicle to put such a concept into prac-
tice. The implementation which was
developed contained minor innovations
in the logic system to permit nonsyn-
chronous commands to be used without
risk of incomplete gas firings, and to
terminate step No. 1 orientation accu-
rately and automatically.
5. 2 NEW COMPONENTS
The redundant quads of PSCR's used
in the sun sensors were developed
especially for the Pioneer program.
The application of a PSCR as the sensing
element of a digital sun sensor was
first conceived and reduced to practice
on Pioneer. The knowledge `:ained from
this application was used advantageously
on the Vela III attitude reorientation
system and on the sun interference
sensor for the Reliable Earth Sensor
program at TRW. In each of these
programs, a PSCR sun sensor was suc-
cessfully developed with unprecedented
speed and economy as a result of the
technology acquired on the Pioneer pro-
gram. Vendor contacts, part specifi-
cation knowledge, test data, thermal
compensation techniques, and methods
for testing were all clearly understood
after the development of the Pioneer
sun sensors. Thu:, at least one Air
Force program and one NASA program(other than Pioneer) have benefited
from the sun sensor experience on
Pioneer at the time of this writing.
The nonvolatile rubber valve seat
developed for the Pioneer pneumatics
assembly was another new component.
The low-leakage properties of this
valve seat material for space applica-
tions have been utilized on several sub-
sequent programs at TRW.
5.3 RELIABILITY FEATURES
The type of redundancy used in the
Pioneer OCS was generally not new or
unique. The choice of PSCR sun sen-
sor detectors was a rather original idea
which greatly simplified the implemen-
tation of sun sensor redundancy. This
choice made it unnecessary to use any
active components other than the detec-
tors themselves to produce a quad re-
dundant sensor  output. Another novel
feature of the sun sensors was a fail-
safe temperature compensation circuit
which caused the sensors to become
undersensitive at temperatures either
above or blow the useable operating
range. T'M: , feature was intended to
prevent false- triggering from the
earth's albedo after various coast and
eclipse conditions which could produce
extreme thermal transients.
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5. 4 PACKAGING INNOVATIONS
The orientation electronics assembly
had a unique packaging design described
in Subsection 2. 3. The electronics
package allowed half of the modules to
extend above the top of the metal case;
these modules were covered only with
thin metallic plating to seal and shield
the electronics.
5.5 TEST EQUIPMENT INNOVATIONS
There were few, if any, innovations in
the design of the test equipment for the
Pioneer OCS. The electronics test con-
sole was straightforward in design.
The pneumatic test console was modeled
after that of OGO with no significant
nuances. A low-intensity solar simula-
tor ( collimated light source)  was de-
signed and built for testing the sun sen-
sors; this equipment is noteworthy only
because it was duplicated for testing the
Vela III sun sensors, avoiding the need
for developing a new design and a set of
drawings for the latter program. A
two-axis test fixture was also developed
for testing the sun sensors. This fix-
ture consisted of two single-axis rotary
tables held at right angles to each other
by a machined support. The horizontal
table was a standard relatively heavy
model. The vertical table was a very
small light-weight model, only 2 in. in
thickness. During test, the sun sensors
were mounted to the smaller table in
such a manner that the rotational axes
of both tables intersected at the center
of the sensor detectors. The test fix-
ture provided a means for testing the
sensor field-of-view without translating
the detectors through the collimated
light beam, an advantage over a con-
ventional two-axis rotary table, and
was fabricated for a fraction of the cost
of available two-axis tables.
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b. IMPROVEMENTS BASED ON RETROSPECTION
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6. 1 EQUIPMENT DESIGN
MODIFICATIONS
If the development of the Pioneer
orientation control system were to be
repeated, the following equipment
changes, would be made-
1) The sun sensors would not utilize
PSCR detectors, since PSCR's
have been found to be very sen-
sitive to radiation and are difficult
to procure. Miniature solar cells
would be used instead. A pos-
sible 'technique which could be
used for the implementation of
redundancy is illustrated in
Figure 6. A more straightfor-
ward redundancy mechanization
would be to provide a separate
preamplifier and threshold cir-
cuit for each of three solar cell
detectors and use majority voting
logic to provide the output signal.
Before the days of integrated
circuits, the latter method was
unattractive because a large
number of components were
required. With today's technol-
ogy, however, this implementa-
tion would probably be preferred.
2) The sun sensor test equipment
would be redesigned to have a
more stable light source with a
shutter system to prevent heating
of the test article. Better elec-
trical shielding would be provided
in the test panel and test cable to
reduce electrical pickup.
4) The electronics assem'Iy would
be changed to utilize a . )dif ied
redundancy technique to permit
testing of all components after
final assembly. The recom-
mended, redundancy implementa-
tion is illustrated in Figure 7.
In the original design, voting was
performed after each circuit
function (such as a gate or flip-
flop). The alternative shown in
Figure 7 would defer voting until
all logic and timing functions
were performed by the three in-
dependent logic and timing units.
INPUT FROM O.C.E.
CONVENTIONAL SCR QUAD
WITH GATES DRIVEN BY
DETECTOR SIGNALS
3) More volume would be provided	 Figure b. Simple Configuration for Re-
in the sun sensor electronics	 dvndant Sun Sensor Using
cavity to facilitate fabrication.	 Solar Cell Detectors
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Figure 7. Alternate Redundancy Tech-
nique for Orientation
Control Electronicsr
Jumpers in the cable harness
would connect the voting circuit
to the other electronic units
during normal operation. During
test, the connector would provide
access to a sufficient number of
test points to permit complete
checkout of the assembly. (Note:
Switching by ground command
between two nonredundant sys-
tems was rejected because step
No. i orientation must be per-
formed automatically without
ground control.)C
5) The electronics assembly would
be modified to supply all neces-
sary signals to the sun sensors
rather than using the spacecraft
equipment converter for that pur-
pose.
6) If PSCR ' s were to be used in the
sun sensors (although this is not
recommended) , the electronics
assembly would be modified to
allow for higher leakage currents
when the detectors are partially
illuminated.
7) The electronics assembly test
consoles would be changed to
provide a more exact simulation
of the sun sensors.
8) In the pneumatics assembly, leak-
age redundant valves would be
used for the solenoid and pressure
I' regulator valves.	 Since the de-
sign of leakage redundant valves
was not developed at the beginning
{
of the Pioneer program, it is
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understandable that such valves
tTO	 were not considered. However,
VAW	 these components have now bee..
developed and could be used, with
minor modifications, on Pioneer.
9) Brazed fittings would be used on
the pneumatic tubing in most
places to facilitate fabrication
and reduce the risk of developing
leaks during launch.
W) The pneumatic fill valve would be
modified to reduce problems.
i 1) If the design were to be repeated
with pu csent day technology, in-
tegrated circuits would be used
extensively in the electronics.
The desired effect of the suggested
changes would be to improve the relia-
bility, design margins, ease of fabrica-
tion, and ease and accuracy of testing
for the OCS equipment. The functional
performance of the control system
would be essentially unchanged.
6. 2 DESIGN APPROACH
MODIFICATIONS
The following changes in general design
approach would probably have reduced
the problems and/or near misses en-
countered in developing the OCS equip-
ment.
i) It is felt that a backup design for
the sun sensors should have been
partially developed to guard
against unfavorable results in
development testing of the PSCR's.
A concept decision tradeoff should
have been performed, with NASA
participation, to choose between
the two design alternatives. This
dual approach would have cost
more money, but it would have
reduced risks substantially.
2) More extensive development
testing, particularly for the sun
sensors, should have been
performed.
3) More effort should have been ex-
erted to complete the sun sensor
thermal analysis before the crit-
ical design review of the sensors.
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6.3 TEST PROGRAM
	 achievement of test plan milestones.
IMPROVEMENTS	 Second, additional Nests should have
been performed at the development
	 #t
It is felt that two improvements in the
	 testing stage and the engineering model
	 ?
test program could have been made.
	 testing stage to examine end-to-end
First, a more detailed development
	 functional performance and compatibility
test plan could have been prepared with
	 of the sensors, orientation electronics,
test reports being issued to indicate the
	 and the pneumatic assembly.
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